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CREDIT REFORM: WHICH WAY TO GO?*
Easy credit is everywhere. American consumers borrow money
from banks, finance companies, and credit unions. They charge
merchandise at large retail stores. And thanks to the ubiquitous
credit card, they can eat in exotic restaurants, stay at vacation re-
sorts, and shop in boutiques from Miami lo Mozambique without
cash in pocket.
The consumer credit phenomenon is startlingly evident in the
growth of debt since the end of World War II. From 1945 to 1970,
personal income rose only 4.5 times; meanwhile, nonmortgage
credit jumped 22 times. In 1973, nonmortgage debt increased at
the startling rate of $1.9-billion a month to reach a total of about
$180-billion outstanding, an average of about $2600 owed per
household.
Along with the comforts of the buy-now-pay-later life, how-
ever, have come a number of serious woes: inflation, high finance
rates, and personal bankruptcies (about 155,000 a year).1  These
* Copyright 1974 by Consumers Union of United States, Inc., Mount Ver-
non, N.Y., 10550. Reprinted by permission from CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1974.
1. The cash customer is another victim of the easy-credit ethic. Contracts
that stores sign with the issuers of credit cards force cash customers to subsidize
credit customers.
Most such contracts require the merchant to pay a fixed percentage of each
credit-card sale to the card issuer. This service charge, which ranges from 2 to
8 per cent, is in addition to the interest that card-holders pay on holdover bal-
ances, and is in addition to the annual fee required of card-holders by such issuers
as Diners Club and American Express. The contracts also require that the mer-
chant charge the card-user the same price as the cash customer.
Thus, a merchant realizes 2 to 8 per cent more when he sells for cash than
when he sells on credit card. But his credit-card contract often forbids him to
share that little bonus with cash customers through discounts, something he might
well do if his contracts allowed it and his cash customers requested it.
A merchant's overhead helps determine his prices. A portion of overhead
is the service charge that gives credit-card customers their pay-later privilege. Is
it equitable to require cash customers to pay prices that help finance a service
they don't use? CU thinks not. Beyond that, we believe contracts that require
merchants to discriminate against cash customers are illegal.
To test our view, lawyers at the Center for Law and Social Policy in
Washington have filed suits in behalf of CU against American Express Co. and
Suburban Trust Company of Maryland, one of a network of banks that issues
BankAmericards. Lawyers call these exemplary suits, meaning that other credit-
card issuers with similar no-discount provisions will probably heed the outcome.
The suits contend that fixed-price contract provisions constitute price fix-
ing-illegal under Federal antitrust laws. The provisions eliminate price competi-
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translate into family crises and social discontent, particularly in low-
income areas, whose residents are most easily harassed by easy-
credit's constant companion, the bill collector.
For years, the consumer has been the victim of archaic credit
laws promulgated by state legislatures, whose members are strongly
influenced by financial interests. Recognizing the problem, Con-
gress in 1968 stepped into what had been largely the states' pre-
serve and passed the Truth-In-Lending Act.2  This laid down for
the first time nationwide rules on garnishment of wages and open
disclosures of credit costs. At about the same time, spurred by the
threat of increasing Federal supervision, the credit industry helped
formulate a sweeping proposal for reform. It was called the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).S
The UCCC was sponsored by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (sometimes called the Uni-
form Commissioners), a group made up of lawyers appointed by
state governors and sustained by appropriations from state legis-
latures. The purpose of the UCCC, according to the Uniform
Commissioners, was "to abolish the crazyquilt patchwork welter
of existing laws on consumer credit and replace them by a single,
new comprehensive law" that would provide adequate credit "at
reasonable cost and fair conditions to both consumers and credi-
tors."4  Each state was to overhaul its credit laws by adopting the
UCCC.
OPPOSITION-AND AN ALTERNATIVE
The UCCC met heavy opposition from consumer groups,
including Consumers Union. Although it did consolidate the maze
tion, and they are tantamount to restraint of trade, the suits allege.
If successful, the suits would require American Express and BankAmericard
to notify merchants that they are free to offer lower prices to cash customers,
and to notify cardholders that discounts for cash are no longer contractually
prohibited. Merchants, in turn, would be requested to post a sign informing
customers of the change. No merchant would be compelled to lower prices, but
would be free to do so-and cash customers would be encouraged to ask about
a lower price.
[CU's suit against American Express was recently settled. By the terms of the
settlement American Express must notify member businesses that they may now
offer their customers cash discounts of three to six percent. Merchants must in
turn "clearly and conspicuously" disclose the availability of cash discounts to their
customers if they offer the discount; however, merchants are not required to give
cash discounts. American Express did not agree to CU's proposal that the com-
pany notify all card holders that cash discounts are now possible from some
merchants. San Francisco Chronicle, April 18, 1974, at 1, col. 1.]
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1968).
3. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Working Redraft No. 5, 1973).
The UCCC can be obtained for $2 from the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, 645 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Il. 60611.
4. Id. at (x).
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of credit laws that had sprung up over the previous 50 years, the
UCCC also authorized legal maximums for interest rates higher
than -those ,prevailing in most states and permitted the continuation
of all but the most abusive of anti-consumer credit practices that
had burgeoned over the years.
The consumer opposition was reasonably successful. Only
seven states have adopted the UCCC (Oklahoma, Utah, Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, Wyoming, and Kansas), 5 and some of these have
added important amendments favorable to consumers. But the
UCCC has not withered and died. The Uniform Commissioners
are still pushing state legislatures for their plan, which CU still re-
gards as inadequate to protect the legitimate rights of consumers
who need both reasonable access to credit and freedom from unfair
collection methods.
The fifth revision of the UCCC, called "the tentative final
draft," was released last November." Although this revision con-
tains some obvious concessions to consumer protection, it does not
yet deal adequately with a number of serious inequities. On the
other hand, state credit laws are certainly in serious need of reform
and greater standardization. Where, then, can state legislators and
consumer groups look for sound advice? At least some of the
answers lie, in CU's opinion, in the Model Consumer Credit Act.7
The Model Act is the product of the National Consumer Law
Center, an organization funded by the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity and concerned with reform of laws to aid low-income con-
sumers. The Model Act grew out of an earlier bill drafted by the
National Consumer Law Center at least partly in response to the
inadequacies of the original UCCC. A look at the different ap-
proaches taken by the UCCC and the Model Act to the major areas
of credit reform will reveal how much more protection is offered
the consumer by the Model Act.
How Do You REACH "FAIR" INTEREST RATES?
An underlying assumption of the UCCC is that interest rates
should be controlled by competition; that, in turn, requires maxi-
mum permissible interest rates substantially higher than those -that
now prevail in most states. The logic works this way: High ceil-
ings on interest rates are necessary to increase the number of lenders
and thus foster competition. But high ceilings may not necessarily
mean high interest rates, because consumers shopping for the best
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The complete text of the Model Consumer Credit Act may be obtained
for $4 from the National Consumer Law Center, 1 Court St., Boston, Mass.
02108.
[Vol. 14
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rate in a competitive marketplace will force down interest charges
for all but the poorest credit risk. Meanwhile, even poor credit
risks would be able to get loans, since a creditor would be permitted
to charge a high rate of interest for the risk he takes.
The trouble with that logic, say UCCC's critics, is that ceil-
ing rates tend to become standard rates-for everyone. There is
wide disagreement on that point among economists, and the data
are imperfect enough to support whichever position one cares to
take.
There are other troubling unknowns about the regulation of
interest rates. Do consumers really price-shop for credit as care-
fully as they might price-shop for, say, a rib roast? If not, people
may wind up paying more for credit than they should have to.
Suppose arbitrarily low credit ceilings were imposed on lenders by
a state legislature. Would legitimate sources of credit for low-in-
come consumers dry up, forcing them to pay the usurious rates
demanded 'by loan sharks and other illicit lenders?
Such questions cannot be answered with any assurance be-
cause much of the data needed for accurate answers are closely
kept 'business secrets.
Not secret, however, is the size of maximum credit charges
that would be permitted by the current version of the UCCC. Open-
end credit plans (revolving charge accounts and bank credit cards)
are now limited to a maximum annual interest rate of 18 per cent
in most states and of 12 per cent in a few. The UCCC authorizes
a 24 per cent maximum;" and if creditors can characterize the
transaction as a loan rather than as a sale, the maximum would go
up to 36 percent,' doubling the maximum rate in most states.
The UCCC would also allow use of the "prior-balance
method" of computing finance charges. Under that system, the
interest charge is based on the balance at the beginning of the bill-
ing period;10 before payments made during the month are deducted.
Even if you paid $95 against a $100 bill, for example, you could
still be charged $2 interest (a 24 per cent annual rate) when the
next month's statement-showing you owed only $5-arrived.
The code would also permit revolving credit agreements under
which creditors could increase interest rates that were low when
the debt was originally incurred, so long as creditors gave notice
twice in the three months before the increase." That could hurt if
8. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREnrr CODE § 2.202 (Working Redraft No. 5,
1973).
9. Id. § 2.401.
10. Id. § 2.202.
11. Id. § 3.205.
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you planned-as many people do--o pay off a big balance over a
long ,period.
On fixed-installment credit plans, the UCCC would authorize
maximums of 36 per cent interest a year on the first $300, 21 per-
cent on the next $700, and 15 percent on anything over $1000.12
Such terms would double the maximum rates -in most states for
financing appliances such as washing machines and TV sets through
credit extended by retailers, making retail credit rates as high as
rates charged by small-loan companies.
The rival Model Act proposes that state legislatures set maxi-
mum rates for each type of credit transaction. However, those
rates, and requests for rate increases, would be set after considera-
tion of data that creditors would be required to turn over to a state
administrator. Such data would include, among other things, infor-
mation on the profitability of credit-granting institutions under
prevailing rates, on the number of consumers denied credit under
prevailing rates and the reasons for denial, on the amount of money
spent by lending institutions on lobbying and other activities un-
related to price competition-all information now generally kept
confidential by the industry. Given appropriate information, of
course, a state legislature might be induced to lower some maximum
rates; but such information might also point toward the desirability
of higher interest rates on certain types of consumer credit trans-
actions.
Another important difference between the Model Act and
the UCCC: In computing finance charges under the Model Act,
creditors must use only the balance from which payments and re-
turns have been deducted.
WHEN DEBTORS CAN'T PAY
One complicated part of credit reform is concerned with
contract provisions that spell out what a creditor can do when the
debtor doesn't pay on time. Creditors have a right to be paid,
and the borrower must be obligated to pay his debt. But the very
nature of credit requires consumers to obligate payments from
future income over which they may have little or no control.
Many people who fall behind in paying debts do so not be-
cause the are "deadbeats" but because they have become unem-
ployed or ill, or because unexpected and extraordinary inflation in
the cost of life's necessities have left no room in a fixed budget for
debt payments. Taking away the cars that people use to go .to work,
the houses they live in, or the appliances they need to maintain
12. Id. § 2.201.
[Vol. 14
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a household creates a further displacement of income and graver
social problems.
As a practical matter, many creditors often make an effort to -
work out alternative arrangements for payment. But the harsh
remedies still available to creditors can ruin people in temporarry
financial difficulty.
The fifth redraft of the UCCC does show some recognition of
this problem. It would protect a higher portion of a wage-earner's
pay from garnishment than does Federal law; the UCCC would
exempt -from garnishment a weekly income of 40 times the Federal
minimum hourly wage ($64 a week. as of this writing), versus 30
-times the minimum wage ($48) under Federal law.' The UCCC
now also contains relief from default judgments for consumers
who don't get notice of court actions or don't realize they are being
sued. 14
On a number of related problems, however, the revised UCCC,
while an improvement over earlier versions, still leaves much to be
desired. Take, for example, "waiver of defense"'" clauses and the
doctrine of "holder in due course,"'10 legal principles that can force
a consumer to continue paying for faulty merchandise or fraudulent
or inadequate services. The UCCC does restrict the use of those
devices in consumer credit, 17 but its language is so ambiguous that
it may not prohibit them entirely. (The Federal Trade Commission
is expected to rule shortly on a staff proposal -to abolish the holder-
in-due-course doctrine in consumer-credit transactions.)
Bank credit cards, moreover, get an important exemption.
A consumer who purchased something worth $50 or less with such
a card would still have to pay the bank, even if the goods were never
delivered or fell apart immediately.'
8
13. Id. § 5.105.
14. Id. § 5.115.
15. In a waiver of defense clause, the buyer waives his right to claim that
the merchandise he purchased is defective in any suit against him for payment
by a third party to whom the seller has assigned his claim for payment, or by
the credit card company if the purchase was made with a credit card or by a
lender if the purchase was made by means of a loan taken out to make that
specific purchase.
16. Often a buyer signs a note in payment for a purchase and the seller in
turn sells the note for immediate cash to a third party, usually a lending institu-
tion. The holder in due course doctrine prevents the buyer from suing the third
party purchaser of the note if the purchase made with the note is unsatisfactory
and requires that the buyer continue paying off the note despite the fact that the
item he purchased may be worthless.
17. UCCC section 3.404 prohibits waiver of defense to protect an assignee of
the seller; section 3.403 prohibits waiver of defense clauses to protect credit card
companies; section 3.405 prohibits those clauses with respect to purchase loans
under certain conditions. Section 3.307 prohibits the use of negotiable instru-
ments except checks and thereby precludes the operation of the holder in due
course doctrine.
18. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.403 (Working Redraft No. 5,
1973).
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SOME SERIOUS OMISSIONS
The UCCC fails to come to grips with a number of more
serious problems. It provides no general homestead protection.
Without that, in some states, a debtor's house could be sold at a
sheriff's sale to pay off as little as a $100 judgment. Moreover,
the UCCC allows an interest rate of more than 28 per cent on
second mortgages over $1000.
The UCCC also allows in virtually every transaction financed
by a direct loan from a bank the procedure that permits creditors
to repossess goods, keep all the payments already made, and still
sue the debtor for -the balance. That procedure would also be per-
mitted on credit extended in all transactions, including those not in-
volving a bank, when the amount financed exceeded $175019-a
provision that would permit automobile dealers, and others who
finance cars, to continue to repossess automobiles. CU believes
a fair credit law might permit repossession or a court judgment
against a defaulting debtor-but not both.
Finally, the UCCC denies the -use of consumer class-action
suits in specific credit grievances.20 A class-action suit is a pro-
cedure that allows a large number of people with a similar grievance
to sue a creditor in a single action. It can be an effective tool for
aggrieved consumers who could not individually afford an attorney
or who would not bother with legal action otherwise.
The Model Act, in direct contrast to the UCCC, is exhaustive
in its effort to deal with these problems without involving the con-
sumer in costly legal action. At the same time, it directs attention
to issues the UCCC ignores. For example, the Model Act contains
wide-ranging prohibitions against discrimination in the granting
of credit because of sex 21 or race. The UCCC is silent on that
question.
19. Id. § 5.103.
20. Id. § 5.201.
21. For years, women have complained of credit discrimination. Working
women earning good salaries have been denied loans or credit cards -unless they
could produce a husband's signature. Couples applying for mortgage loans have
found that the woman's salary didn't count when it came to figuring out how
big a loan the couple could handle; or it counted only after a series of prying
questions had established that the couple was following a satisfactory course of
birth control.
This form of sex discrimination has begun to crumble. Last December, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) announced that savings and loan
institutions could no longer consider gender as a factor in making mortgage loans.
Some 14 states have outlawed at least certain forms of sex discrimination in the
credit field.
Nevertheless, credit discrimination based on sex still exists. If you encounter
such a problem at a Federally-chartered savings-and-loan association, report it to
a regional office of the FHLBB. If the problem occurs at a Federally-chartered
commercial bank, try a regional office of the Federal Reserve Board. (The Fed-
[Vol. 14
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The Model Act clearly establishes that consumers must have
their day in court 'before creditors can repossess goods or attach
bank accounts or otherwise deny consumers their property. The
UCCC is mute on that issue, too, although it guarantees the hearing
rights of creditors threatened with punitive action by the state for
illegal behavior.
The Model Act also goes into detail on the handling of com-
puter errors, a problem the UCCC does not address Finally, the
Model Act strengthens a number of areas already regulated by Fed-
eral laws-credit disclosures, credit reporting, and the consumer's
liability for lost or stolen credit cards. The UCCC attempts no
improvement on Federal credit standards, even though the clear
intent of Congress was merely to establish minimum standards.
RECOMMENDATIONS
CU's view remains the same as the one we expressed in March
1969: "We don't think any state, no matter how bad its existing
credit laws, should adopt the UCCC without extensive amend-
ments in favor of consumers."
eral Reserve Board does not have a formal policy similar to the FHLBB's, but a
spokesman told CU: "We might be able to do something informally.")
For problems with state-chartered banks, or with credit cards, a call to the
state attorney general's office might help. Don't overlook organized women's
groups. Some make it a point to keep up with state laws affecting women's
rights. And the pressure they exert can be a lever to pry open coffers of credit
that shouldn't have been closed in the first place.
1974]
